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[E]ducation has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.
We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when
select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon
which our social order rests.'
1. Introduction
The number of limited English proficient (LEP) students in the nation's
public primary and secondary schools is growing:2 65% more LEP students
enrolled in American schools in 2004 than had in 1994. 3 In the 2001-2002
school year, there were 3,977,819 LEP students in grades K-12, a 71.9%
4increase from the 1991-1992 estimate. Current numbers of LEP students are
three times what they were in the 1980s 5 and LEP students represent
approximately 8.4% of all public school students in the United States. 6 All fifty
1. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
2. ANNETrE M. ZEHLER ET AL., DESCRIPTVE STUDY OF SERVICES TO LEP STUDENTS AND
LEP STUDENTS WITH DISABIrrEs: VOL. I RESEARCH REPORT, at vii-viii (2003), available at
http://www.ncela.gwu.edu/resabout/research/descriptivestudyfiles/volI_research-fiulltxt.pdf (last
visited Mar. 17, 2008).
3. Jeanne Batalova, Spotlight on Limited English Proficient Students in the United States,
MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE, Feb., 2006, http://www.migrationinformation. org/USFocus/display.
cfn?ID=373 (last visited Feb. 11, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. ZEHLER ET AL., supra note 2, at vii-viii.
5. Immigration and Bilingual Education, 4 MIGRATION NEWS, June 1997, at 4,
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/comments.php?id=l 245020 (last visited Feb. 7,2008) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See ZEHLER ET AL., supra note 2, at vii (basing statistics on 2001-2002 school
membership data from the Common Core of Data, U.S. Department of Education).
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states enroll LEP students in their schools.7 This is caused in large part by the
recent rise in immigration-over 14 million immigrants entered the United
States during the 1990s alone (both legally and illegally),8 and immigrants are
entering states and localities that have never before experienced large-scale
immigration.9 By 2020, more than one of every seven American residents will
be foreign bom.' 0
Paradoxically, there is a movement to make English the official language
of the United States in order to "preserve English and the 'American' way of
life from encroachment by a growing number of linguistic minority groups.""
Such an attitude detrimentally affects LEP students when they are placed in
regular English-speaking classes. Without special instruction in learning
English, these children are precluded from receiving a meaningful education
because they cannot comprehend what they are learning. 12 The ramifications of
this trend extend beyond language borders-students who are not properly
educated are more likely to drop out of school and commit crimes.'
3
7. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PROGRAMS FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEARNERS 11 (1999).
8. Michael Fix & Randy Capps, Immigrant Children, Urban Schools, and the No Child
Left Behind Act, MIGRAION INFO. SOURCE, Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.migration
information.org/USfocus/print.cfn?ID=347 (last visited Jan. 14, 2008) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). The share of children of immigrants among the school-age
population also increased rapidly, tripling from 6% in 1970 to 19% in 2000. Id.
9. Lisa B. Ross, Note, Learning the Language: An Examination of the Use of Voter
Initiatives to Make Language Education Policy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1510, 1511 (2007).
10. Sam Roberts, Study Foresees the Fall of an Immigration Record that has Lasted a
Century, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at All (describing a Pew Research Center study of the
tremendous rise in immigration predicted over the next 40 years). "Sometime from 2020 to
2025, the Center estimates, the foreign-born will account for 15 percent of the nation's people.
Immigrants were about 12 percent of the population in 2005 ... ." Id.
11. Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 321,
349 (1987).
12. See, e.g., Guadalupe Org. v. Tempe Elem. Sch. Dist., 587 F.2d 1022, 1025 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1978) (citing the Bilingual Education Act, Pub. L. No. 90-247, § 701, tit. VII (1968)). The
court stated:
The Congress hereby finds that one of the most acute educational problems in the
United States is that which involves millions of children of limited English-
speaking ability.., and that the urgent need is... to develop forwardlooking
approaches to meet the serious learning difficulties faced by this substantial
segment of the Nation's schoolage population.
Id.
13. See, e.g., Terri Lynn Newman, Comment, Proposal: Bilingual Education Guidelines
for the Courts and the Schools, 33 EMORY L.J. 577, 577 (1984) ("High dropout rates and
increased crime rates among children limited in English proficiency have been attributed to their
inability to understand instruction in the English-only classroom."); Andrew Sum et al., The
Hidden Crisis in the High School Dropout Problems of Young Adults in the US.: Recent
Trends in Overall School Dropout Rates and Gender Differences in Dropout Behavior 3, 17
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However, the Equal Educational Opportunities Act 14 (EEOA) can protect
the right of LEP students to an equal education. Although this Note argues that
the language of the EEOA is currently too vague to protect sufficiently the
rights of LEP students, the statute is clearly capable of assisting these students.
For example, the Yonkers, New York Board of Education recently reached a
settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in which it agreed to pay
$300 million over five years to fund remedial educational programs.15 Some of
these programs will improve Yonkers's inadequate services for LEP students.
16
The Yonkers settlement, arising under the EEOA, is an example of the
potential inherent in the thirty-four-year-old statute. To promote settlements
such as this one, this Note argues that the EEOA must be amended in order to
assure equality of education for language minority students.
Proposing additional statutory language necessitates an understanding of
the nature of the EEOA, the law on education generally, and the problems
surrounding the statute that have arisen in the courts. Thus, Part II of this Note
discusses the social and political framework from which the EEOA was born.
Part III disproves concerns that the EEOA does not validly abrogate state
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. Part
IV traces the definition of "appropriate action" as it has appeared in the courts
over the last three decades, and Part V proposes new statutory language that
will clarify the responsibilities of the educational agencies so as to assure
compliance with the EEOA, protect the rights of LEP students, and reduce
litigation over the issue in the courts.
(2003), http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/914.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2008) (providing
data on immigrant dropout rates as well as tracing the link between failure to receive a high
school diploma and serving time in jail or becoming homeless). For more information on
current education issues, including the positions of the 2008 Presidential candidates, see
http://www.edin08.org.
14. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1721 (2000).
15. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Educational Opportunities Section,
Overview, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/edo/overview.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2008) [hereinafter
Overview] (setting forth the responsibilities of the Educational Opportunities Section to
investigate possible violations of the EEOA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
16. Id.; see also United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 123 F. Supp. 2d 694, 714
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that vestiges of segregation existed in the Yonkers Public School
system in part because the school provided inadequate services for LEP students).
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II. Background on the Equal Educational Opportunities Act
In 1974, Congress passed the EEOA.17 The act states: "No State shall
deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her
race, color, sex, or national origin, by... (f) the failure by an educational
agency to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede
equal participation by its students in its instructional programs." 8 This Part
explores education law and the history of the EEOA language in order to shed
light on the congressional purpose of the act and also to determine whether
such congressional intent has been fulfilled.
A. Education Law Generally
Education has been recognized as "perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments.' 9 The Supreme Court has linked success in life
to a child's educational opportunity,20 declaring: "In sum, education has a
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society."2' However,
education is not a fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution.
22
Instead, the opportunity of education, "where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.,
23
17. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1721. Todaythe Educational Opportunities Section of the Civil
Rights Division of the DOJ enforces the EEOA. See Overview, supra note 15 (setting forth the
responsibilities of the Educational Opportunities Section). The Section has the right to
intervene in private suits alleging violations of education-related anti-discrimination statutes and
also represents the Department of Education in lawsuits. Id.
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1703. It should be noted that the EEOA only applies to the activities of
state and local educational agencies at the elementary and secondary levels. "The EEOA does
not impose any obligation on state higher education systems or authorities." United States v.
Texas, 793 F.2d 636, 649 (5th Cir. 1986).
19. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954), aff'd349 U.S. 294 (1955); see also
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) ("Providing public schools ranks at the very
apex of the function of a State.").
20. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 ("[I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.").
21. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); see also Mariela Nufiez-Janes, Bilingual
Education and Identity Debates in New Mexico: Constructing and Contesting Nationalism and
Ethnicity, 44 J. Sw. 61, 75 (2002) ("Education in the United States is perceived as the great
equalizing force: a good education provides hope and power.").
22. See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Education Program, Compulsory
Education, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/educ/CompulsoryEd.htm (last visited Jan. 20,2007)
(providing a background on state compulsory education as well as information on individual
state policies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
23. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973) (holding that the
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Further, despite the importance of education to society, the Court has never
recognized a constitutional right of LEP students to be taught in their native
language. Instead, the Court has held that under federal law a school district
must provide non-English-speaking students with foreign language instruction
or, alternatively, teach them to speak English.24
B. The Equal Educational Opportunities Act
Civil Rights era controversies on desegregation, busing, language rights,
and the nebulous ideal of "equal education" helped shape the legislation that
became the EEOA.25 On March 16, 1972, in his address to the nation,
President Nixon discussed two companion proposals: one which would call for
a moratorium on new busing, and one which would be entitled the Equal
Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages and
that education is not a fundamental right or liberty) (emphasis added) (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at
493). Yet, all fifty states make mention of free, public education for children, typically through
the age of twenty-one, in their constitutions. ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256, amended by ALA.
CONST. amend. CXI; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARiz. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art.
XIV, § 1, amended by ARK. CONST. amend. 53; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. IX,
§ 2; CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2d, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183;
LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, Part 1, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS.
CONST. Part 2d, ch. V, § II; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; Miss.
CONST. art. VIII, § 201; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art.
VII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2d, art. LXXXIII; N.J. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 4(1); N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D.
CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art.
VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art.
X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; W. VA.
CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
24. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) ("[T]he district must take affirmative
steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open its instructional program to these
students." (citing the Office of Civil Rights's 1970 guidelines)). But see Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 226 n. 13 (1972) ("[Jefferson] proposed that state citizenship be conditioned on
the ability to 'read readily in some tongue, native or acquired."' (emphasis added) (quoting
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Cabell (Sept. 9, 1817), in WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 417, 423-24 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Elleny Bergh eds., 1904))). For
historical data on the history of language rights during the country's formation, see SANDRA DEL
VALLE, LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDING OUR VOICES 9-22
(2003).
25. The Equal Educational Opportunities Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 204, 88 Stat. 484,
515 (1974).
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Educational Opportunities Act.26 Although the EEOA would not be passed
until 1974, in his proposal, Nixon stated that "[t]his act would require that
every State or locality grant equal educational opportunity to every person,
regardless of race, color, or national origin. ' ,27 Nixon affirmed that the Act
would establish "an educational bill of rights for ... [those] who start their
education under language handicaps .... The next day, in a Special
Message to Congress, Nixon described the EEOA as "plac[ing] the emphasis
where it belongs: on better education for all of our children."2 9 Nixon's entire
message expressed a desire to clarify and direct the courts in the wake of the
many education-related rulings and regulations. He declared that the EEOA
would create a uniform set of standards for all the federal courts by
"establish[ing] criteria for determining what constitutes a denial of equal
opportunity. 30 It would be a way for Congress, drawing on its experience, to
direct the courts.3'
President Nixon emphasized his desire to shift control of educational
decisions from the judicial branch to the legislative branch when he concluded
that his proposals would address "the inherent inability of the courts, acting
alone, to deal effectively and acceptably with the new magnitude of educational
and social problems generated by the desegregation process." 32 He viewed the
judiciary as the branch least capable of handling educational issues. Despite
the law's intentions, however, the EEOA's vague language ultimately leaves it
to the courts to shape the concept of equality in education for LEP students. In
fact, the EEOA embodies the Supreme Court's decision in Lau v. Nichols.
33
26. Address to the Nation on Equal Educational Opportunities and School Busing, 90
PuB. PAPERS 425, 426 (Mar. 16, 1972) [hereinafter Address to the Nation]. Also, for a cogent
discussion of the EEOA's origin, see Martin Luther King Jr. Elementary School Children v.
Michigan Board of Education, 451 F. Supp. 1324, 1330-31 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
27. Address to the Nation, supra note 26, at 426.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Special Message to the Congress on Equal Educational Opportunities and School
Busing, 91 PUB. PAPERS 429, 435 (Mar. 17, 1972) [hereinafter Special Message].
30. Id. at 430.
31. Id. at 436.
32. Id. at 442-43. Similarly, the next year, in 1973, the Supreme Court reiterated this
sentiment when it stated that "educational policy, [is] another area in which this Court's lack of
specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the
informed judgments made at the state and local levels." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973).
33. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974) (holding that, under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, a school district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language
deficiencies of its students in order to provide for their effective participation in educational
programs). In Lau, the Supreme Court considered whether an alleged failure by the Board of
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In Lau, a seminal decision for language minorities, the Court recognized
the unfairness of teaching all students alike, without regard to their language
abilities.34 The Court stated that "there is no equality of treatment merely by
providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum;
for students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any
meaningful education. 3 5 The Court, in one of its first interpretations of what
sort of "appropriate action" a school should legally take, suggested that the
school at issue teach English to the non-English speaking Chinese students or
give instructions in the students' native language.36 The Court's finding in Lau
that LEP students were deprived "a meaningful opportunity to participate in the
educational program 3 7 reignited Nixon's 1972 EEOA proposal.
Congress passed the EEOA in 1974 as a House bill that amended the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 .38 The only legislative
history available comes from an identical bill in 1972. 39  The House
Committee on Education and Labor, which approved the legislation in 1972,
stated that:
[T]he committee bill for the first time in Federal Law contains an
illustrative definition of a denial of equal educational opportunity. It is the
purpose of that definition.., to provide school and governmental
Education to assure that plaintiffs achieved English proficiency violated either the Fourteenth
Amendment or Title VI. Id. at 564-66. Plaintiffs were non-English-speaking Chinese students
seeking relief against the unequal educational opportunities in their schools. Id. at 564. Relying
on administrative interpretations of Title VI by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW), as well as the Office of Civil Rights Guidelines, the Lau Court found that the
failure of a school district to take swift and effective action to aid language minority students
denied them equal educational opportunity under Title VI. Id. at 568. The Court reasoned that
equality of treatment for language minority students must go beyond merely providing students
with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum because "students who do not
understand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education." Id. at 566.
Accordingly, the Court stated that a system to deal with the special language needs of national
origin minority group children should quickly be designed to meet such needs. Id. at 568; see
also Rachel F. Moran, Undone by Law: The Uncertain Legacy ofLau v. Nichols, 16 LA RAA
L.J. 1, 6 (2005) (explaining that the EEOA was "[e]nacted by Congress to codify the Lau
decision").
34. Lau, 414 U.S. at 566.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 565 (explaining the school's remedial options).
37. Id. at 568.
38. Equal Educational Opportunities Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 204, 88 Stat. 484, 515
(1974).
39. See Jonathan D. Haft, Assuring Equal Educational Opportunity for Language-
Minority Students: Bilingual Education and the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974,
18 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 209,233 (1983) (describing the limited legislative history of the
EEOA) (citing 120 CONG. REc. 8262 (1974)).
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authorities with a clear delineation of their responsibilities to their students
and employees and to provide the students and employees with the means
to achieve enforcement of their rights.
40
A committee report further indicated that the purpose of the EEOA was to
provide equal education to LEP students: "As President Nixon has stated, these
children will not have true equality of educational opportunity until these
language and cultural barriers are removed.
4 1
Responses to the EEOA were varied, although most concentrated on the
advantages and disadvantages of bilingual education in schools. 42 The LEP
community showed its strength by boycotting schools, for instance, when
bilingual programs were threatened.43 (Interestingly, while the language of
§ 1703(0 does not mention bilingual education, but instead uses the nebulous
term "appropriate action," the legislative history indicates that bilingual
education may have been expected as the means to provide the students with
equal participation.44 However, bilingual education is not required by the
EEOA. 45) One particularly strong editorial pointed out that even after Lau,
40. H.R. REP. No. 92-1335, at 3 (1972); see also United States v. State, 506 F. Supp. 405,
431-32 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (looking at the legislative history of the EEOA), rev'd United States v.
Texas, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982).
41. H.R. REP. No. 92-1335, at 6(1972).
42. See, e.g., id. ("It should not be necessary for [an LEP student] to sacrifice his rich
native language and culture to achieve such participation ... rather, we should utilize available
language skills and thought processes to foster intellectual development while developing
English language proficiency."); Alfonso A. Narvaez, Educators Back a Bilingual Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1973, at 21 ("One of the problems the United States has long had in the old
theory of the melting pot is that English is the only language .... We favor bilingual education
for every child in this state who needs it, not just Puerto Ricans, but Greeks, Italians, Chinese,
whatever." (quoting New York State Senator Robert Garcia)). But see Simon H. Rifkind, Letter
to the Editor, Bilingualism in New York City Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1972, at 20 ("I
discern in the bilingual movement a serious threat to the tranquility of our city... to divide the
city into two separate societies, one English-speaking and one Spanish speaking .... Bilingual
schooling will, for the rest of their lives, make them sound like aliens.").
43. See Joan Cook, 2,000 Hispanic Children Boycott Newark Classes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
1974, at 92 ("More than 2,000 Hispanic children stayed away from nine elementary schools here
today in protest against an impending cutback in bilingual classes."); Alfonso A. Narvaez, 800
Demonstrate for School Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1974, at 83 (describing a demonstration in
New York to maintain a bilingual program).
44. See Equal Educational Opportunities Act: Hearing on H.R. 13915 Before the H.
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 92d Cong. 140-41 (1972) (statement of Elliot Richardson,
Secretary, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare [now Health and Human Services])
("This would be the first time that Congress ever affirmatively declared that there is a right to
receive bilingual education. It would mean, therefore, that in the future any refusal to provide it
would be a violation of law.").
45. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,576 F. Supp. 1503,1510 (D. Colo. 1983) (stating
that the EEOA "did not specify that a State must provide a program of bilingual education to all
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some school boards were slow to initiate LEP programs and waited for a court
order before taking any action.46 In light of educational agencies' potential
hesitancy to act and the fact that LEP children "will not have true equality of
educational opportunity until these language and cultural barriers are
removed '47 it is imperative to clarify the EEOA.
Clarifying the statutory requirements would enable localities to maintain
discretion and control over the specifics of the educational program chosen,48
while ensuring that LEP students have a baseline of protections that would
suitably provide them with equal educational opportunities. Before tracing the
courts' treatment of § 1703(f) over the last three decades, and before proposing
an amendment to the statute itself, Part III of this Note argues that the current
statute validly abrogates state sovereign immunity. Thus, the EEOA serves as a
viable tool by which LEP plaintiffs can sue states or state educational agencies
in federal courts.
III. Eleventh Amendment Abrogation
The value of a proposed amendment to the EEOA is diminished if, as49
academic scholars have recently claimed, the EEOA does not validly abrogate
a state's sovereign immunity. If this is true, no plaintiff can bring suit against a
state or its educational agency in federal court. 50 Such a limitation reduces the
flexibility of a plaintiff's choice of action 51 and his ability to timely file a
limited English speaking students").
46. Editorial, Dragged Into Progress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1974, at 14 ("The board's
reluctance to lead, instead of being dragged, onto the path of progress is particularly
troubling....").
47. H.R. REP. No. 92-1335, at 6 (1972).
48. See Special Message, supra note 29, at 439, 442 ("Given our highly decentralized
national educational system and the relatively minor role one Federal program usually plays...
[the EEOA] will create more local choice and more options to choose from.").
49. See Moran, supra note 33, at 7 (stating that the EEOA may not abrogate state
sovereign immunity because the statute does not expressly abrogate immunity and because the
purported abrogation might not be "congruent and proportional" to documented constitutional
misconduct); Geoffrey Landward, Note and Comments, Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett and the Equal Education Opportunity Act: Another Act Bites the Dust, 2002
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 313, 323 (2002) (arguing that because the EEOA lacks language that
specifically abrogates state immunity, it will fail to meet the requirements for congressional
abrogation of state immunity as outlined in Garrett).
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
51. See Eden Davis, Unhappy Parents ofLimited English Proficiency Students: What Can
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case. 52 This Part argues that, contrary to recent claims, the EEOA does in fact
validly abrogate a state's sovereign immunity, thereby enabling plaintiffs to
bring claims in federal court.
A. Governing Standards of the Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution renders the states immune
from "any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State. 5 3 The Supreme Court consistently finds that immunity extends
to suits brought by any nonconsenting state's own citizens.54 Still, Congress
can abrogate this immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Determining whether Congress validly abrogates state
immunity requires the resolution of two preliminary questions: "first, whether
Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity; and
second, if it did, whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of
constitutional authority. 56  To answer the second question, a court must
They Really Do?, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 277,278-81 (2006) (explaining that suing a state under the
EEOA is one of only three options available to parents unsatisfied with the methods employed
in teaching limited English proficient students); see also Moran, supra note 33, at 8 ("If the
Eleventh Amendment challenge to the EEOA holds up, plaintiffs would have to abandon a
disparate impact theory under this statute as well as Title VI [of the Civil Rights Act].").
52. See Moran, supra note 33, at 8 ("[L]itigators would be forced to bring suits district by
district, a time-consuming and burdensome task. As a result, some actions would be entirely
beyond the reach of private lawsuits under federal law.").
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
54. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). The Court
stated:
Although by its terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a State by
citizens of another State, our cases have extended the Amendment's applicability to
suits by citizens against their own States. The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh
Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in
federal court.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003)
(stating that the Eleventh Amendment "does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits
against nonconsenting States"); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)
("Accordingly, for over a century now, we have made clear that the Constitution does not
provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States.").
55. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), which allowed Congress to abrogate state
immunity pursuant to its power under the Interstate Commerce Clause, leaving Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment as the sole basis under which Congress can abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
56. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004).
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determine whether the law is "congruent and proportional '57 to the injury it
seeks to remedy.58
B. Congress Unequivocally Expressed Its Intent to Abrogate State Immunity
Whether the EEOA validly abrogates a state's sovereign immunity has
never been doubted by the courts. 59 Congress, in writing the EEOA, did
unequivocally express its intent to abrogate the states' immunity. 60 Section
1703 provides that: "No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an
individual on account of... national origin, by (a) the deliberate segregation by
an educational agency of students on the basis of race, color, or national origin
among or within schools; ... .,,61 For the purposes of § 1703, an "educational
agency" is "a local educational agency or a 'State educational agency' as
defined by [20 U.S.C. § 3381 (k)].,,62 Section 3381 (k) explains that the "term
'State educational agency' means the state board of education or other agency
or officer primarily responsible for the State supervision of public elementary
and secondary schools, or, if there is no such officer or agency, an officer or
agency designated by the Governor or by State law."63 Section 1706 permits an
"individual denied an equal educational opportunity... [to] institute a civil
57. Id. at 531.
58. See id. ("Section 5 legislation is valid if it exhibits a 'congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.'" (quoting
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997))); see also Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728 ("We
distinguish appropriate prophylactic legislation from 'substantive redefinition of the Fourteenth
Amendment right at issue,' by applying the test set forth in City ofBoerne." (quoting Kimel, 528
U.S. at 81)).
59. See United States v. Texas, No. CIVA 6:71CR5281 WWJ, 2006 WL 2350013, at *7
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 11,2006) ("Here, there is no question, and Defendants concede, that Congress
clearly intended to abrogate sovereign immunity in enacting the EEOA."); see also Gomez v. Ill.
State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Congress abrogated the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity to the extent necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
[EEOA]."); L.A. Branch NAACP v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1983)
(explaining that the EEOA abrogates a state's sovereign immunity and thus "clearly authorizes
desegregation suits against state educational agencies"); Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989,
1008 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[It is undisputed in this case, and indeed indisputable, that in
enacting the EEOA Congress acted pursuant to the powers given it in § 5 of the [F] ourteenth
[A]mendment.").
60. Lane, 541 U.S. at 517.
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (2000) (emphasis added).
62. Id. § 1720.
63. Id. § 3381 (k). This includes every state "agency or officer" empowered by state law to
enforce compliance with the Act in the public schools. Idaho Migrant Council v. Bd. of Educ.,
647 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1981).
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action in an appropriate district court of the United States against such
parties... .,"64 By specifying the responsibilities of the educational agencies
and by specifically granting individuals the power to file federal suit when
those agencies do not meet their obligations, the EEOA authorizes suits against
state educational agencies.
65
Despite the EEOA's language, scholars still question whether abrogation
is present. One scholar recently noted that "the EEOA does not expressly
abrogate state immunity., 66 However, a literal declaration has never been the
Supreme Court's test for congressional abrogation.67 Surely if language to the
effect of "a State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution from an action in federal court" was necessary for Eleventh
Amendment abrogation, at least one of the many cases in which the Supreme
Court has looked at immunity68 would have so stated. Another scholar argues
that "[t]he authorization for federal suits makes no mention of suits against the
state. 69 Yet, by repeatedly specifying that "educational agenc[ies], 7 ° which
include "State educational agenc[ies]," 71 are responsible for protecting equal
educational opportunities, and by allowing a private right of action in federal
court for violations of this mandate,72 Congress speaks of suits against the state.
Even though § 1706 does not expressly refer to the states, "it is clear from the
language set forth above that the obligations of § 1703(f) are imposed on the
64. 20 U.S.C. § 1706.
65. See, e.g., L.A. Branch NAACP v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir.
1983) (holding that because the California Board of Education and the California Department of
Education fell within the Act's definition of state educational agency and because Congress,
acting under the Fourteenth Amendment, explicitly provided for desegregation suits against this
type of agency, the California agency's immunity was abrogated).
66. Moran, supra note 33, at 7 (emphasis added); see also Landward, supra note 49, at
324 ("[W]ithout an express declaration of congressional intent, the Court will not infer that
Congress meant to abrogate state immunity." (emphasis added)).
67. This is true even in the case on which the scholar critical of the abrogation idea bases
his Comment. Landward, supra note 49, at 323; see Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (stating that Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity when it "unequivocally intends to do so").
68. See generally Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
69. Landward, supra note 49, at 324.
70. 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (2000).
71. Id. § 1720 (emphasis added).
72. Id. § 1706.
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states and their agencies. '7 3  Any other interpretation "would render that
enactment a dead letter ab initio 0 4 because plaintiffs would not be able to bring
actions in federal court against the very actors who could violate the EEOA-
the states and educational agencies. There would be no sense to the statute.
Additionally, a critic has posited that "abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity is objective, and does not rely on congressional intent. 75 Yet, the
governing Supreme Court tests for abrogation are peppered with the word
"intent."76 Finally, even the defendants in EEOA cases rarely challenge the
question of whether Congress unequivocally intended to abrogate immunity.77
Thus, when Congress wrote the EEOA, it sufficiently expressed its unequivocal
intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
C. Congress Acted Pursuant to a Valid Grant of Constitutional Authority
Congress, in writing the EEOA, acted pursuant to a valid grant of
constitutional authority. "Eleventh Amendment immunity can be waived by the
state, or by Congress acting pursuant to its enforcement powers under
[S]ection 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 8 That Section gives Congress the
power to ensure that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
79
The EEOA, in § 1702, states:
73. Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 1987).
74. Id. "Any action under § 1706 to enforce § 1703(0 can only be maintained against
entities that would ordinarily be immune under the Eleventh Amenmnt... (because] without
the abrogation of sovereign immunity, state agencies would, in practice, vanish from that
definition." Id. at 1037-38.
75. Landward, supra note 49, at 324.
76. A critic has admitted the need to search for congressional intent to abrogate as he
states that a "[c]ongressional act that purports to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity must contain an unequivocal expression of Congress's intent to abrogate." Id.
(emphasis added).
77. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 (2004) ("As in Garrett, no party disputes
the adequacy of that expression of Congress' intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity." (citation omitted)); L.A. Branch NAACP v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 946,
951 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[W]e hold that the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the California
agency defendants has been abrogated. The state defendants do not dispute our reading of the
Equal Educational Opportunities Act."); United States v. Texas, No. CIVA 6:71 CR5281 WWJ,
2006 WL 2350013, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2006) ("Here, there is no question, and
Defendants concede, that Congress clearly intended to abrogate sovereign immunity in enacting
the EEOA.").
78. L.A. Branch, 714 F.2d at 950 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976)).
79. U.S. CONST. amend XIV § 1.
"APPROPRIATE ACTION," INAPPROPRIATEL Y DEFINED 653
For the foregoing reasons, it is necessary and proper that the Congress,
pursuant to the powers granted to it by the Constitution of the United
States, specify appropriate remedies for the elimination of the vestiges of
dual school systems, except that the provisions of this chapter are not
intended to modify or diminish the authority of the courts of the United
States to enforce fully the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution of the United States.
80
Although Section 5 is not specifically mentioned,
8' there is little argument
82
that Congress passed the EEOA pursuant to anything but the enforcement
authority of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
8 3
D. The Congruence and Proportionality Test
Although Congress has a "wide berth [under the Fourteenth Amendment]
in devising appropriate remedial and preventative measures for unconstitutional
actions, those measures may not work a 'substantive change in the governing
law."'84 Thus, to determine whether Congress's legislation is appropriate, the
courts must determine whether the legislation is "congruent and proportional,
85
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (2000).
81. See EEOC v. Wyoming 460 U.S. 226,243 n. 18 (1983) (finding that a statute need not
expressly refer to Section 5 or to the Fourteenth Amendment as long as congressional intent to
act pursuant to those powers is otherwise clear).
82. See Moran, supra note 33, at 7 ("[T]he EEOA does invoke congressional powers
granted pursuant to the Constitution as authority for enacting the statute. This general statement
will likely suffice, even though section 5 is not specifically mentioned."); see also Landward,
supra note 49, at 324-25 ("Although the EEOA only makes reference to congressional powers
in the Constitution, it seems unlikely that the Court would determine that the EEOA is based on
anything but the Fourteenth Amendment.").
83. U.S. CONST. amend XIV § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); see Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 811
F.2d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 1987) ("There can be no dispute that the EEOA was passed pursuant
to the enforcement authority of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Castaneda v. Pickard, 648
F.2d 989, 1008 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing the EEOA in relation to the Fourteenth
Amendment). Speaking to the issue of the constitutional grant of authority, the Castaneda court
states:
The general declaration of policy contained in § 1701 and § 1702 of the EEOA
expresses Congress' intent that the Act specify certain guarantees of equal
opportunity and identify remedies for violations of these guarantees pursuant to its
own powers under the fourteenth amendment without modifying or diminishing the
authority of the courts to enforce the provisions of that amendment.
Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1008 n.9.
84. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 (2004) (quoting City of Boeme v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 519 (1997)).
85. Id.at531.
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639 (2008)
to the harm it seeks to prevent. Courts make this determination by analyzing
(1) whether there has been a history and pattern of unconstitutional actions on
account of the constitutional right at issue, and (2) whether the statute is
proportional to the harm identified.
1. History and Pattern of Unconstitutional Action Based on National
Origin
The constitutional right at issue is the right of a national origin minority to
equal educational opportunities. The EEOA seeks to prevent denial of "equal
educational opportunity to an individual.., on account of... national
origin."86 A history and pattern of unconstitutional action based on national
origin is revealed by analyzing the legislative history of the EEOA.87
Additionally, historical experience 88 may be shown by the congressional
record;89 "the decisions of other courts [that] document a pattern of unequal
treatment";90 by looking at law review articles, or state and local regulations; 9'
and by searching for a pattern of discrimination in non-state governmental
units, such as local school boards or districts.
92
Generally, the Supreme Court notes that many states have a history of
discrimination and an unequal distribution of educational opportunities based
86. 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (2000).
87. See infra note 94 and accompanying text as well as supra Part II.B (discussing the
unconstitutional treatment minority national origin status faced in school).
88. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
638 (1999) ("[T]he propriety of any § 5 legislation must be judged with reference to the
historical experience... it reflects." (citations omitted)); see also Lane, 541 U.S. at 523
(explaining that historical experiences need to be analyzed).
89. See United States v. Texas, No. CIVA 6:71CR5281 WWJ, 2006 WL 2350013, at *12
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2006) (stating that, in evaluating the legislative history at issue in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,730-31 nn.3 & 5 (2003), the Supreme
Court looked at testimony that pertained to earlier, related legislation, not just those hearings
directly related to the legislation in question).
90. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 525 (2004).
91. See Texas, 2006 WL 2350013 at *8 (stating that other cases have referenced these
resources as evidence of past discrimination); see also McCarthy v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407,423
(5th Cir. 2004) (Garza, J., concurring) ("The Supreme Court, in Tennessee v. Lane.... [rIelying
almost exclusively on federal case law, [] concluded that 'Congress enacted Title II against a
backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of state services and
programs. .... "' (quoting Lane, 541 U.S. at 524)).
92. See Texas, 2006 WL 2350013 at *8 ("[A]fter Lane, we do not look solely at the state
level for a history and pattern of unconstitutional action, we also examine discrimination by
nonstate government entities." (citing Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272,277 n. 14
(5th Cir. 2005))).
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on the race of the students. 93 Similarly, there was other well-documented
evidence of discrimination against national origin minorities in the public
schools presented to Congress during the time it enacted the EEOA. For
instance, months before passage of the EEOA, Martin Gerry, acting director of
the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) for the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW), testified before Congress about the nationwide pattern of
exclusion of national origin minority students from meaningful participation in
educational programs.94 The OCR conducted reviews of school districts'
performance in meeting guidelines that it had set forth and found that "[t]he
exclusion of national origin minority students from the full benefits of the
educational program appeared to be continuing each year."95 Additional
congressional testimony highlighted the discrimination that was felt by national
origin minorities prior to passage of the EEOA.9 6 Moreover, a pattern and
history of discrimination in the schools against national origin minorities
motivated the 1970 HEW memo which presented findings indicating the
frequency of practices denying equality of educational opportunity to Spanish-
surnamed pupils. 97 Students from other national origin minority groups, for
98example, Chinese or Portuguese, similarly faced discriminatory practices.
93. See generally Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Public Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,240-41
(1991); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
94. Bilingual Education Act: Hearing on H.R. 1085, H.R. 2490, and H.R. 11464 Before
the Gen. Subcomm. on Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 93d Cong. 20, 21 (1974)
[hereinafter BEA Hearings] ("[N]ational origin minority children were, as a group, in many
school districts[,] being excluded from full and effective participation in, and the full benefits
offered by, the educational programs operated by such districts.").
95. United States v. Texas, No. CIVA 6:71CR5281 WWJ, 2006 WL 2350013, at *11
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2006) (citing BEA Hearings, supra note 94, at 23).
96. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REc. 15431 (May 20, 1974) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
("Mexican-American youngsters are not only shunted out of the college bound courses, but all
too frequently are placed in classes for the mentally retarded-not because of any intelligence
deficiency, but because of an English language deficiency."); Bilingual Education Act: Hearing
on H.R. 1085, HR. 2490 and H.R. 22464 Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Educ. of the Comm. on
Educ. andLabor, 93d Cong. 53 (1974) (statement of L. Ling-Chi Wang, Professor, University
of California at Berkeley) (testifying that several thousand Asian-American students needed, but
did not receive, any English language assistance between the years of 1969 and 1973); id at 187
(statement of Herman LaFontaine, Exec. Administrator, Office of Bilingual Education, New
York City Board of Education) ("[W]e have this large number of students who do not speak the
language and are thereby prevented to a certain extent from actually developing and taking
advantage of the leaming process in the schools.").
97. Memorandum from the Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare on Language Minority
Children to School Districts with More Than Five Percent National Origin-Minority Group
Children (May 25, 1970), http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/laul970.html (last
visited Jan. 14, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
98. Id.
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Also, numerous cases leading up to the passage of the EEOA discuss at length
the discrimination that was taking place towards national origin minority
students in the schools, 99 including segregation justified by language
deficiency.100 Clearly, Congress passed the EEOA using sufficient evidence of
a history and pattern of national origin discrimination in the schools.
2. The EEOA Is a Proportional Response to the Harm Identified
Because "[t]he appropriateness of the remedy depends on the gravity of
the harm it seeks to prevent,"' 0' the more egregious the harm, the more latitude
Congress enjoys when passing legislation. The "appropriate action"
requirement is designed to "break the cycle of stereotype-driven discrimination
against LEP students."'0 2 The EEOA is reasonably "prophylactic legislation',1
0 3
because discriminatory conduct violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
A statute invalidly abrogates state immunity if it creates new substantive
constitutional rights. °4 Thus, to be valid, prophylactic legislation should be
"narrowly targeted"'10 5 at eliminating the discrimination. The EEOA, which
requires state educational agencies to take "appropriate action" only with
respect to English language proficiency, is sufficiently narrow so that it does
not redefine any constitutional rights. The EEOA does not impose any
stringent standards on the states but rather is flexible and allows the states to
create their own remedial language programs. The law is aimed specifically at
99. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 197 (1973) (stating that Hispanic
students in Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas "suffer from the same
educational inequities as Negroes and American Indians"); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,
479 n. 10 (1954) (finding that the Mexican-American schools in which Jackson County, Texas
placed its students were provided with about half the resources of the Anglo schools); Cisneros
v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 324 F. Supp. 599, 612 (S.D. Tex. 1970) ("It is obvious to
the court from the evidence that the Mexican-Americans have been historically discriminated
against as a class in the Southeast and in Texas."), aff'd 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972).
100. See generally United States v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972);
Gonzales v. Sheely, 96 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Ariz. 1951); Mendez v. Westminister Sch. Dist. of
Orange County, 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946).
101. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523-24 (2004).
102. United States v. Texas, No. CIVA 6:71CR5281 WWJ, 2006 WL 2350013, at *13
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2006).
103. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003).
104. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,519-24 (1997) (explaining that legislation
that is not a congruent and proportional response to a constitutional injury will overreach and
redefine the scope of protection granted by the Fourteenth Amendment).
105. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738.
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overcoming the problems of English language deficiency and the record of
discrimination.
Because the EEOA is congruent and proportional to the national origin
discrimination identified, sovereign immunity is validly abrogated and thus,
plaintiffs can bring suits in federal courts against states and state educational
agencies. Part IV describes the types of claims that are brought under the
EEOA and sets forth why LEP students are better served by more explicit
statutory language.
IV. Defining "Appropriate Action"
A plaintiff may institute a civil action to protect his right to equal
educational opportunity under the EEOA.10 6 The EEOA is like "an educational
bill of rights for [those]... who start their education under language
handicaps." 0 7 Yet the statute's open-ended "appropriate action" requirement
does not define what is required to state a claim, what type of allegations
plaintiffs may make, or to what acts by an educational agency "appropriate
action" applies.108  The legislative intent of the EEOA clearly indicates
Congress's desire to reserve specific decisions of LEP programming for state
and local educational agencies. 0 9 But, equality of education is attained not
only through sufficient programming. This Part explores the other areas which
affect equality of education and those to which "appropriate action" should
explicitly apply.
A. "Appropriate Action" As Understood by the Courts
Courts emphasize that Congress and educational agencies are the bodies
with the discretion to determine what "appropriate action" means.1 0 Setting
106. See 20 U.S.C. § 1706 (2000) ("An individual denied an equal educational
opportunity, as defined by this subchapter [20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1721 ] may institute a civil action
in an appropriate district court of the United States against such parties, and for such relief, as
may be appropriate.").
107. Address to the Nation, supra note 26, at 426.
108. Sandra Cortes, Comment, A Good Lesson for Texas: Learning How to Adequately
Assist Language-Minorities Learn English, 13 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 95, 107 (2006)
(illustrating that the EEOA neither defines appropriate action nor explains what types of
programs will satisfy the appropriate action requirement).
109. See infra Part IV.A (outlining the intended lack of specificity in programming).
110. See, e.g., Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1041 (7th Cir. 1987)
("[W]e must be careful not to substitute our suppositions for the expert knowledge of educators
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the parameters for "appropriate action" is a job for Congress, not the courts,
especially in light of President Nixon's pronouncement of the inability of the
courts to deal effectively with educational problems."' However, it is the
courts themselves that have assessed and attempted to elucidate the § 1703(f)
language. Still, the combination of vague statutory language, coupled with
the intention for local discretion over programming, prompted the Fifth
Circuit to set out a test to measure whether a program met the "appropriate
action" language of the statute. 1 2 Using the test, the courts have found a
wide array of programming to be compliant with the EEOA "appropriate
action" language: bilingual education, 113 English as a Second Language
or our judgment for the educational and political decisions reserved to the state and local
agencies."); see also United States v. Texas, 680 F.2d 356, 370 (5th Cir. 1982) (asserting that
courts are not experts on issues of education). The Fifth Circuit stated:
The issue is essentially a pedagogic one: how best to teach comprehension of a
language. Neither we nor the trial court possess special competence in such
matters. It follows that on such thin ice both tribunals should tread warily, doing
no more than correcting clear inequities and leaving positive programming to those
more expert in educational matters than are we.
Id. at 370; Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 996 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[I]t is educators, rather
than the courts, who are in a better position ultimately to resolve the question whether such a
practice is, on the whole, more beneficial than detrimental to the students involved."); Teresa P.
v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698, 715 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (discussing the court's
reluctance to assess an educational program).
111. See Special Message, supra note 29, at 442-43 (discussing Nixon's preference that
Congress, not the courts, work on educational issues).
112. Although the Fifth Circuit's test is the most cited, three years earlier, a South Dakota
court also attempted to clarify the § 1703 language by requiring,
more specific methods for identifying on admission those children who are
deficient in the English language and for monitoring the progress of such
children[,] ... a training program for bilingual teachers and bilingual aides[,] ... a
method for transferring students out of the program when the necessary level of
English proficiency is reached. It should not isolate children into racially or
ethnically identifiable classes, but it should encourage contact between non-English
and English speaking children ....
Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
113. Bilingual education is defined by the Department of Education as "instruction in two
languages and the use of those two languages as mediums of instruction for any part of or all of
the school curriculum. Study of the history and culture associated with a student's mother
tongue is considered an integral part of bilingual education." Guad. Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem.
Sch. Dist., 587 F.2d 1022, 1025 n.1 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing U.S. Office of Educ., Draft
Guidelines to the Bilingual Education Program, in T. ANDERSSON & M. BOYER, BILINGUAL
SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES, at app. B (1970)). These may include transitional bilingual
education programs. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 576 F. Supp. 1503, 1516 (D. Colo.
1983) (mem.) (explaining such programs facilitate the integration of the child into the regular
school curriculum by emphasizing English while at the same time utilizing the student's native
language as a medium of instruction to ensure academic success), af#'d 895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir.
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(ESL) classes,1 14 and English Immersion115 programs.
1. The Castaneda Three-Prong Test
In Castaneda v. Pickard, 16 the Fifth Circuit fashioned a three-prong test
to determine the appropriateness of a school system's language remediation
program when challenged under § 1703(f). It explained:
1990). For an argument advocating the provision of full bilingual education, see Thomas
Kleven, The Democratic Right to Full Bilingual Education, 7 NEv. L.J. 933, 937-39 (2007)
(contending that the Equal Protection Clause mandates full bilingual education to those desiring
it).
114. In an ESL program, LEP students receive instruction in English in all substantive
topics and are "pulled-out" for ESL classes while English speakers are in nonacademic classes.
Haft, supra note 39, at 248. An ESL program seeks to promote communication between a LEP
student and his peers and teachers. Id. While ESL may lead to faster mastery of the English
language, because LEP students receive all instruction in English, even before they understand
it, they often suffer academic underachievement in the substantive areas. Id. at 249-50. For
more information on ESL programs see Newman, supra note 13, at 612-14.
115. In this method, LEP students learn English in a short, intensive period in which
subject-matter instruction is taught almost entirely in English. Catherine Johnson, Note, The
California Backlash Against Bilingual Education: Valeria G. v. Wilson and Proposition 22 7,
34 U.S.F. L. REv. 169, 170-71 (1999). The goal here is to have the LEP students placed in
mainstream classes as soon as their English skills are proficient. Id. For example, in Valeria G,
Proposition 227, the program at issue, was a sheltered English immersion program. This meant
that LEP students were to be taught in an immersion program "during a temporary transition
period not normally to exceed one year... [and then] transferred to English language
mainstream classrooms." Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
116. Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009-10 (5th Cir. 1981) (remanding to the
district court to determine whether the school district had discriminated against Mexican-
Americans in the past, to consider whether the effects of any past discrimination were fully
erased and then to decide the merits of the claims of the plaintiffs). In Castaneda, the court
considered, in part, whether the school district unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiffs by
failing to implement adequate bilingual education to overcome the linguistic barriers that
allegedly impeded the plaintiff's equal participation in the educational program of the district.
Id. at 992. This led the court to question whether Congress, in enacting § 1703(f), intended to
impose on schools, through the use of the term "appropriate action," a specific obligation. Id. at
1008. More specifically, the court questioned whether the school district's testing method to
measure the progress of students in the bilingual education program was appropriate. Id. at
1014. The school district employed an ability grouping system based on achievement test
scores among other things, id. at 996, and operated a bilingual education program, id. at 1004-
05. While stating that the EEOA validly abrogated a state's sovereign immunity, id. at 999, the
court found that Congress could not have intended any particular program's implementation
under the EEOA, id. at 1008. However, the court laid forth a three-prong test to determine the
appropriateness of a school's language remediation efforts. Id. at 1009. Finally, the court
remanded the case to the district court for it to determine the precise causes of the language
deficiencies of some of the district's teachers. Id. at 1014.
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First, the court must examine carefully the evidence the record contains
concerning the soundness of the educational theory or principles upon
which the challenged program is based....
The court's second inquiry would be whether the programs and
practices actually used by a school system are reasonably calculated to
implement effectively the educational theory adopted by the school....
Finally ..... [i]f a school's program, although premised on a legitimate
educational theory and implemented through the use of adequate technique,
fails, after being employed for a period of time sufficient to give the plan a
legitimate trial, to produce the results indicating that the language barriers
confronting students are actually being overcome, that program may, at that
point, no longer constitute appropriate action as far as that school is
concerned.117
This test is used to evaluate allegations that an educational agency has violated
a plaintiff's rights under the EEOA. 8
Although other courts that have considered § 1703(f) claims since 1981
rely on Castaneda, not all of them fully subscribe to its framework." 9 Nor is
the test free from criticism.120 In fact, one scholar has claimed that the
deference to defendant school districts places an "almost impossible burden
117. Id. at 1009-10.
118. See, e.g., Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 1987)
(setting forth the plaintiff's claim under the EEOA).
119. See Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698, 713 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
("[Tihe Castaneda guidelines require fine tuning, but nonetheless provide a helpful analytic
structure." (citing Gomez, 811 F.2d at 1041)); Quiroz v. State Bd. of Educ., 1997 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 24154, at *20 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (criticizing the third prong of the Castaneda test for
failing to provide guidance as to what standards a court should use in evaluating an educational
plan).
120. See Teresa P., 724 F. Supp. at 715 (criticizing the third prong because "[n]either the
EEOA nor the Castaneda court explains how it is that a federal court is to judge the results of a
school district's language remediation program"); see also Tristan W. Fleming, Note, Education
on Equal Terms: Why Bilingual Education Must be Mandated in the Public Schools for
Hispanic LEP High School Students, 17 GEO. IMMIOR. L.J. 325, 338 (2003) (pointing out that
the third prong does not explain what the time period should be after which the educational
agency must show results, thus leaving school districts to determine for themselves whether
their program has failed). Fleming also questioned whether the second prong, a rational basis
review standard for "reasonably calculated" would be consistent with the Supreme Court's
heightened scrutiny requirements for a "discrete class of children" expressed in Plyler v. Doe.
Id.; see also Eric Haas, The Equal Educational Opportunities Act 30 Years Later: Time to
Revisit "Appropriate Action "for Assisting English Language Learners, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 36 1,
362 (2005) (stating that the first prong "misinterprets the role of federal judges in assessing the
soundness of a scientific theory and the qualifications of an expert by deferring too readily to
the scientific justifications put forth by school district officials and proposition supporters").
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upon the plaintiffs: [To] demonstrate that no expert supports the underlying
theory as sound under any circumstances."'2 Still, this Fifth Circuit test largely
predominates in analyzing § 1703(f) violations.
Regardless of its merits or detractions, this test fails to assess anything
except programming. It serves to measure if the program is a legitimate
response to LEP student needs and does not define other areas to which the
term "appropriate action" applies. Moreover, it is a judicial tool of
interpretation that can be used only once the case is in litigation before a court.
Congress must amend the EEOA to more specifically delineate the
requirements the educational agencies must take initially, in the implementation
stage. After the statutory language is expanded, then a test like the one in
Castaneda can be used in litigation to measure whether the agencies' programs
have reached the required level of "appropriate action." Otherwise, Congress
circumvents its own legislative intent by tacitly ignoring the problems LEP
students continue to face.
B. Categories to Which "Appropriate Action" Should Explicitly Apply
LEP students' claims under the EEOA indicate that the courts permit
broader allegations than simply claims of inadequate or improper language
programming. The EEOA framework entertains, although the diffuse statutory
language does not mention, five different categories of claims:
(1) programming; (2) identification and grouping of students; (3) oversight and
management of programming; (4) teacher hiring and training; and (5) funding.
If a "district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in
order to open its instructional program to these students,"'23 then Congress,
through amendment, must specify these five areas in the EEOA.
1. Programming
A common complaint by LEP plaintiffs alleges a failure of defendant
educational agencies or school districts to provide them with equal educational
services. Because of the variety in programming, allegations take many forms.
For example, some claims of insufficient programming allege that pressing LEP
121. Haas, supra note 120, at 378.
122. See generally Ross, supra note 9, at 1510, 1529-32 (arguing that voter initiatives that
mandate uniform methods of instruction are not appropriate methods for making language
education policy).
123. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974).
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students to read and write, at grade level, in both English and their native
language, violates the EEOA. 24 Plaintiffs have asserted that such demands
impermissibly overemphasize the development of English language skills. 25 In
California, certain plaintiffs argued that the district program did not provide
them with adequate English language development instruction or adequate
native tongue support.126 Specifically, they challenged the district's alternative
to bilingual education-an ESL program at the elementary level, and ESL
classes and a sheltered English program at the secondary level. 127
More recently, certain other plaintiffs in California moved to enjoin the
implementation of an initiative which rejected bilingual education programs in
favor of an educational system designed to teach LEP students in English early
in their education.128 Seemingly, any action an educational agency takes is
subject to suit. Because of the discretion in programming inherent in the
EEOA, if these discrete programming choices pass the Castaneda evaluation,
they are considered sufficient to reach "appropriate action." Yet, other areas
besides programming are as important to equal education for LEP students.
2. Identification and Grouping of LEP Students
Plaintiffs also bring claims under the EEOA for improper and unequal
ability grouping in the schools. In one example, plaintiffs stated the school
district unlawfully discriminated against LEP students by using an ability
grouping system for classroom assignment that was based on racially and
ethnically discriminatory criteria. 129 In another instance, a school district used
an identification questionnaire but then employed teachers not trained in
"linguistics, bilingual education, other languages, or in detecting language
problems" 130 to evaluate the results of the test. LEP students have also claimed
124. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1006 (5th Cir. 1981) (claiming that under the
Lau Guidelines, pressing English on the LEP students is not a primary goal); see also Martin
Luther King Jr. Elem. Sch. Children v. Mich. Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 1324, 1330 (E.D.
Mich. 1978) (stating that "Black English" is as much of a language barrier as any foreign
language).
125. Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1006.
126. See Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698, 700 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(explaining one of the many claims the plaintiffs had against the school district).
127. Id. at 702-05.
128. See Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (explaining the
programming under Proposition 227).
129. See Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 992 (setting forth the plaintiffs' claims of unlawful
grouping of students which led to inequality of education).
130. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 576 F. Supp. 1503, 1514 (D. Colo. 1983) (mer.), aff'd,
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that even if a program rests on a pedagogically sound basis, its
implementation can violate the "appropriate action" standard of the
EEOA.' 3 1 For example, some plaintiffs claim that school districts fail
completely in assessing and recognizing LEP children. 1 2  This is
particularly dangerous because improper assessment of LEP students can
result in students being "misassigned to lower academic tracks or special
education programs"' 3 3 or simply ignored altogether.
In one case, plaintiffs were injured by a failure of a local school board
and superintendent to promulgate "uniform and consistent guidelines for
the identification, placement and training of LEP children."'134 The school
had been able to avoid education requirements by purposefully identifying
less than the number of LEP children that triggered LEP programming.
35
Another court found a violation of the EEOA where identification of LEP
students depended on the classroom teacher to link underachievement with
possible language deficiency, stating that "there is no assurance that
language deficient children in the upper grades will be identified."'136 LEP
student identification and grouping are aspects of equal education, and
because they are not explicitly mentioned in the EEOA, educational
agencies may not aptly recognize that failures in these areas constitute
failures to take "appropriate action." Students will suffer without a clear
requirement in the statute saying that educational agencies must properly
identify and group LEP students.1
37
895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1990).
131. See Teresa P., 724 F. Supp. at 715 (arguing that the identification test is not good
because it does not provide an appropriate basis to determine whether a student is limited
English proficient because the test is normed upon the English language skills of LEP students
rather than those of native English-speaking students).
132. See id. at 700 (claiming the testing exam fails to provide an appropriate basis to
determine whether a student is LEP).
133. Sonja Diaz-Granados, Note, How Can We Take Away a Right that We Have Never
Protected: Public Education and Immigrant Children, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 827, 850 (1995).
134. Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1033 (7th Cir. 1987).
135. See id. (alleging that that districts would purposefully identify less than twenty LEP
students of the same primary language and claiming that the grouping problems were caused by
insufficient guidance by the board of education and the superintendent).
136. Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
137. See United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405, 424 (E.D. Tex. 1981) ("The accuracy of
this initial assessment mechanism is vital to ensuring that special help is provided to those
children who need it.").
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3. Oversight and Management of Language Programs
Plaintiffs also claim that the EEOA is violated by a lack of
management over language remediation programs-broadly categorized as
oversight claims. This may include claims of inadequate staffing of the
administrative body in charge of monitoring. 38  For example, plaintiffs
charge that educational agencies violate the EEOA by failing to supervise
districts in the state to ensure that no child is denied program benefits on
account of national origin. 139 Plaintiffs have brought claims following an
educational agency's abandonment of on-site monitoring, enforcement, and
supervision of school districts to ensure compliance with the state's bilingual
education program. 140 The DOJ has reviewed whether a school district was
sufficiently monitoring the students enrolled in the LEP program and those
students who had already exited the program. 141 One court found a violation of
the EEOA because of a lack of adequate testing. 142 Without oversight of the
programs in place, efforts to help LEP children are futile.
4. Teacher Hiring and Qualifications
Allegations under the EEOA also include claims of improper teacher
hiring, promotion, and training.143 "[i]f the teachers charged with day-to-day
responsibility for educating these children are termed 'qualified' despite the
fact that they operate in the classroom under their own unremedied language
138. See id. at 427 (discussing how the responsibilities of the agency charged with
administrating the language programs include having sufficient numbers of staff).
139. See Cintron, 455 F. Supp. at 70 (claiming that the State Department of Education,
Board of Education, and Superintendent failed to sufficiently exercise their supervisory powers
over the local districts); see also Texas, 506 F. Supp. at 408 (alleging violations of the EEOA).
140. See United States v. Texas, No. CIVA 6:71CR5281 WWJ, 2006 WL 2350013 at *2
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2006) (setting forth the plaintiffs' claims).
141. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Equal Educational Opportunities
Section, Case Summaries, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/edo/documents/casesummary.htm, (last
visited Feb. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Case Summaries] (explaining the Civil Rights Division's
actions with respect to the Bound Brook, New Jersey school district) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
142. SeeKeyesv. Sch. Dist. No. 1,576 F. Supp. 1503, 1518(D. Colo. 1983) (mem.) ("The
lack of an adequate measurement of the effects of such service is a failure to take reasonable
action to implement the transitional bilingual policy."), aff'd, 895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1990).
143. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1981) (claiming the school
district unlawfully discriminated against Mexican-Americans in the hiring and promotion of
faculty and administrators).
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disability,"' 44 then the language program is unlikely to have a significant impact
on the LEPs' language barriers. Thus, plaintiffs argue that education agencies
must provide expert assistance to school districts to remedy both the foreign
language deficiencies of the teachers and the in-service training they receive.
145
Other claimants argue that school districts fail to ensure that teachers and other
instructional personnel have the requisite qualifications, credentials, and skills
to provide their services effectively. 46 The courts have not required teachers to
possess language-specific credentials in order to deliver remediation programs
consistent with the EEOA.147 Courts still seem to allow agencies a high degree
of deference in hiring, training, and maintaining their staff so that, although
plaintiffs can bring claims against educational agencies for violations of
§ 1703(f) with respect to teacher hiring and preparedness,148 they often lose.
For example, a statistical difference between bilingual teachers in a geographic
area and qualified teachers that are actually employed by a school may create a
prima facie case of unlawful discrimination as prohibited by the EEOA, but
defendants may rebut this prima facie evidence when they explain the statistical
difference in light of "local circumstances and resources." 149 A court that
looked into this issue tested all programs "against reality.' 50 Meaning, where
an area proves to be a less desirable place to work than its neighboring school
districts, and when the school district charged has engaged in "substantial
144. Id. at 1013.
145. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 470 (5th Cir. 1986) (alleging a violation of
the EEOA by the state educational agency).
146. See Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698,700 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(setting forth a claim of a violation of the EEOA); see also Moran, supra note 11, at 323
("[B]ilingual education statutes have typically included waiver provisions that enable English-
speaking teachers to instruct... LEP students while acquiring bilingual teaching skills.").
147. Teresa P., 724 F. Supp. at 714-15. But see Keyes, 576 F. Supp. at 1516 (finding that
schools without adequate qualification testing of bilingual teachers violated the EEOA). The
EEOA was also violated when the court found that the school did not require any special
training for ESL teachers. Id. at 1514.
148. See, e.g., Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1013 (exemplifying problems in teacher
preparedness). The Castaneda court, commenting on problems with teachers stated:
The record in this case strongly suggests that the efforts [the school district] has
made to overcome the language barriers confronting many of the teachers assigned
to the bilingual education program are inadequate.... Until deficiencies in this
aspect of the program's implementation are remedied, we do not think [the district]
can be deemed to be taking "appropriate action" to overcome the language
disabilities of its students.
Id.
149. Teresa P., 724 F. Supp. at 14.
150. Id.
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recruiting" efforts, the court did not find a violation of the "appropriate
action" requirement.'
15
Unqualified teachers will surely stymie efforts by LEP students to
overcome their language barriers. "The key to an effective elementary
bilingual classroom is the ability of the teacher to communicate with the
children."'152 But, without specific language in the EEOA indicating that
improper training of personnel constitutes a failure to comply with the
statute, LEP students may continue to be taught by unqualified teachers.
5. Funding for LEP Programs
Plaintiffs bring claims faulting districts for failing to allocate adequate
resources to the special language services for LEP students. 5 3 A claim of
failure to take "appropriate action" by insufficient funding also exists when
there are insufficient services for LEP students. For example, a strict
neighborhood assignment system permitted only students living in white
neighborhoods to "reap the benefits"'15 4 of the construction of new schools.
Surely a benign intent to help LEP students is inadequate if states do not
commit resources to the programs. The EEOA should indicate that such
funding deficiencies equate to a violation of the statute.
C. Requirements for a Legally Sufficient EEOA Claim
Vague statutory language creates a broad scope of possible allegations,
forcing a court to struggle in determining what the EEOA requires to state a
claim. Additionally, there is "limited case law regarding what is required
to state a claim under § 1703(f) of the EEOA."' 15' A Michigan court
required that plaintiffs allege language barriers, demonstrate how language
barriers impede education, note what appropriate actions the defendant
151. Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 469 (5th Cir. 1986).
152. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 576 F. Supp. 1503, 1516 (D. Colo. 1983) (mem.), aff'd,
895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1990).
153. See Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698, 700 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(setting forth claims that the defendant violated the EEOA).
154. Leslie v. Bd. of Educ. for I11. Sch. Dist. U-46, 379 F. Supp. 2d 952, 956 (N.D. Ill.
2005). But see Deerfield Hutterian Ass'n. v. Ipswich Bd. of Educ., 468 F. Supp. 1219, 1232
(D.S.D. 1979) (finding no violation where, for example, a local board of education refuses to
provide funds for establishment of a school near a Hutterite colony but offers to bus children
into town and establish a bilingual-bicultural program at an existing school).
155. Leslie, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 960.
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failed to take, and identify the causal connection. 156 Recently, however, an
Illinois court declared that such requirements were too rigorous because
they forced the plaintiffs to propose a solution.l5 7 The Illinois court chose
to look "to the clear language of the statute, which establishes ... the
elements of a § 1703(0 violation: (1) language barriers; (2) defendant's
failure to take appropriate action to overcome those barriers; and (3) a
resulting impediment to students' equal participation in instructional
programs." 58 Thus, by some courts' standards, a plaintiff can state a claim
by expressly alleging that a defendant's failure to provide adequate LEP
services interferes with and impedes an LEP student's ability to overcome
language barriers. Congress should alleviate this confusion among courts
by clarifying the standards necessary to state a claim under the EEOA. Part
V's proposed amendment seeks to incorporate lessons from case history
into the EEOA in order to clarify requirements under the Act.
V. An Amendment to the EEOA
Unfortunately, "America's schools have achieved limited success in
meeting the needs of these [LEP] students, who have four times the dropout
rate of their peers who are fluent in English, as well as higher grade
repetition rates."' 59 The statute's vague wording does not sufficiently
protect the students in school who are unable to understand English. 60
Because the issue of instruction for LEP students under the EEOA has
never reached the Supreme Court, 16 a "return to the courts to litigate these
156. Id. (citing Martin Luther King Jr. Elem. Sch. Children v. Mich. Bd. of Educ., 463 F.
Supp. 1027 (E.D. Mich. 1978)).
157. See id. (stating reasons why the Michigan court's analysis would not be applied in
Illinois).
158. Id.
159. MARNIE S. SHAUL, U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, PUBLIC EDUCATION: MEETING THE NEEDS
OF STUDENTS wiTH LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY 3 (2001).
160. See, e.g., Peter W. Hahn, Note, Recognizing the Disability: Extending the (Tenuous)
Rights of English-Language-Deficient Students in Public Schools, 53 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 271,274 (1998) (commenting that although there is federal legislation in place to
protect the rights of LEP students, it has resulted in ambiguous standards and is particularly
disturbing in light of debate over making English the official language of the United States).
Also, "while Congress has enacted legislation that requires schools to help [LEP] students
overcome their language barriers, it nonetheless has failed to articulate the statutes' coverage.
Finally, neither the courts nor Congress have established standardized procedures to guide
schools on how to overcome these language barriers." Id. at 292.
161. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 120, at 337 ("The Supreme Court has not interpreted
the statute's language, the legislative history is not clear, nor has the statute not [sic] been
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issues" 162 leads to undesirable results: (1) LEP students may have to await
verdicts before they are given equal educational opportunities; (2) the courts, in
fashioning tests and analyses in an attempt to understand § 1703(f), end up
legislating in place of Congress; and (3) different courts achieve disparate and
incongruent results that create a confusing atmosphere and an uncertainty as to
what is truly required. 1
63
The Castaneda test is only useful as a judicial tool of interpretation once a
case is brought to court by a plaintiff and, as noted above, the claims brought
may be as egregious as a teacher's own "unremedied language disability."' 64 It
comes too late. Although the Educational Opportunities Section of the DOJ
has listed conditions that may violate the EEOA, 165 if Congress truly wants the
EEOA to be an "educational bill of rights"'166 for language minority students,
then it needs to signal to educational agencies that they must initially take
"appropriate action" with respect to more than just programming, and cannot
wait until a claim is brought in court. If a claim is still brought to court, then a
test such as an adapted Castaneda test could be applied to measure whether
there was, in fact, a violation. With over thirty years of EEOA experience
behind it, Congress has enough information to amend the 1974 legislation in a
way that guarantees "appropriate action" for LEP students, while at the same
amended or clarified by Congress. Furthermore, because there has been little litigation in
general on this subject, we are left with a problematic statute.").
162. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 576 F. Supp. 1503, 1521 (D. Colo. 1983) (mem.), aff'd,
895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1990).
163. See Haft, supra note 39, at 213 ("As a consequence of the Court's failure to set a
standard form of relief, lower federal courts considering the issues of compensatory language
instruction have ordered various remedies, ranging from deference to locally formulated
remedies on the one hand, to bilingual-bicultural methods on the other.").
164. Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981).
165. These conditions include:
1. A school fails to provide a language acquisition program to its [LEP] students;
2. A school fails to provide resources to implement its language acquisition
program effectively (e.g., an ESL program lacks ESL teachers or ESL
materials);
3. A school fails to take steps to identify students who are not proficient in
English;
4. A school does not exit [LEP] students from a language acquisition program
when the [LEP] students have acquired English proficiency, or a school exits
[LEP] students without written parental or guardian permission before the
students acquire English proficiency.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Discrimination Against English Language Learner Students,
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/edo/ellpage.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2007) (setting forth examples of
conditions that may violate the EEOA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
166. Address to the Nation, supra note 26, at 426.
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time maintaining local discretion to prevent any court from acting as a
"Supreme Board of Education."' 67  This Part proposes an amendment to
§ 1703(f) that will clarify its purpose, lay out more specific requirements for
educational agencies, and protect the right of LEP students to equality of
education.168
A. New Statutory Language Proposed
The language of the proposed § 1703 would state (addition in italics):
No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on
account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by...
(f) the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to
overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students
in its instructional programs. 69 Failure to take appropriate action shall
apply to, but shall not be limited to, failures in (i) programming,
(ii) identification and grouping ofstudents, (iii) oversight and management
of the language program, (iv) teacher hiring and training, and (v) funding.
To state a claim, a plaint ineed not look any further than the requirements
within this subsection.
167. Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ("There is a
legitimate policy debate among respected educators and scholars on this issue [of which
education system is better]. But, most important, that is not a debate for this court to resolve.
This court is not a Supreme Board of Education.").
168. It is also important to remember that, as it stands now, individual state constitutions
supply their own appropriate standards, and these clauses vary by state. The courts are therefore
further stymied when trying to determine whether the "appropriate action" requirement has been
met. See Diaz-Granados, supra note 133, at 834 (explaining how the additional factor of state
constitutions adds to the confusion over the EEOA in the courts).
169. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2000).
170. Of course, new statutory language creates the concern that the legislation will no
longer be remedial and prophylactic but that it instead becomes substantive and thus no longer
validly abrogates a state's sovereign immunity. The EEOA is distinguishable from the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 at issue in Garrett, in which the ADA was found not to
validly abrogate states' sovereign immunity because there was no "pattern of discrimination by
the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment," nor was the remedy "congruent and
proportional to the targeted violation." Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). The proposed EEOA language here is such that it is still
congruent and proportional to the harm identified. As Part III.D analyzes, this language is also
narrowly targeted and yet flexible so that it addresses the constitutional violation without
creating any new rights. As Part III describes, the EEOA is both remedial in its response to a
history of discrimination, and proportional to the harm that was identified. Additionally, the
language of the proposed amendment is still broad enough that is does not infringe on the power
of the states to regulate the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.
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Language regarding the identification of students is critical to support the
goal of the EEOA that LEP students receive equality of education.
Misidentification of students wastes scarce resources, 171 and "[i]mproper
assessment of LEP students results in students being wrongly assigned to lower
academic tracks or special education programs."'172 The DOJ recognizes the
danger of not identifying students as LEP students. 173  It recently raised
concerns about a school district's procedures for screening new students to
determine whether they were LEP students. 174 The proposed amendment will
help alleviate such identification problems because it will affirmatively
establish and explicitly direct educational agencies to look to areas like
identification when taking "appropriate action" to overcome its students'
language barriers.
With respect to oversight and management, besides the obvious concern
that the programs will not be effectively helping LEP students, ineffective
management could lead "to problems with orientation, enrollment delays,
transportation snafus, special education evaluations, confusion over school
expectations and a lack of information to parents on meetings and activities.' 75
Valid testing of student progress is "essential to measure the adequacy of a
language remediation program"'176 and "[t]he success of any language education
program depends largely on how it is implemented."' 177 The statute should be
clear that program oversight is included with the "appropriate action"
requirement so that educational agencies will initiate effective management
171. Johnson, supra note 115, at 188 (quoting a particular social science analyst and
former Educational Researcher for the U.S. Department of Education).
172. Diaz-Granados, supra note 133, at 850.
173. See Case Summaries, supra note 141 (explaining the investigation the DOJ's Equal
Educational Opportunities did into the Bound Brook Board of Education in Bound Brook, New
Jersey). As a result of the investigation, good-faith negotiations between the DOJ and the Board
of Education took place, resulting in an October 16, 2003 agreement requiring the district to
provide timely assessment of all students with non-English speaking backgrounds. Id. The DOJ
was also concerned in United States v. North Plainfield Board of Education that the school
district was insufficiently screening new students to determine whether they were LEP students.
Id. On September 3, 2004, the school district and the school entered into a settlement
agreement outlining the measures the district would take to ensure it complies with the EEOA.
Id.
174. Id.
175. Eleanor Chute, Somalis Say Rights Violated, PrrrSBURGH POST-GAzETrE, May 17,
2005, at B 1 (discussing complaints under the EEOA by more than fifty Somali Bantu refugees
enrolled in the Pittsburgh Public Schools).
176. Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1014 (5th Cir. 1981).
177. Ross, supra note 9, at 1535.
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methods when implementing their program instead of only after this issue is
litigated.
Not all states require that teachers of ESL or bilingual programs hold any
special certification, and for those that do, many of the teachers have
substandard certificates.178 Paradoxically, evidence suggests that the "quality of
the teachers is a more significant factor in student achievement than the choice
between bilingual instruction and English immersion." 179 Without specific
language in the EEOA indicating that improper training of personnel
constitutes a failure to comply with the statute, LEP students may continue to
be taught by unqualified teachers. This proposed language will heighten the
standards of what is provided to LEP students in the way of teacher
competency.
Language about funding must be included in the EEOA such that LEP
students and educational agencies will know that there is a failure "to take
appropriate action" where there is inadequate program funding.180 Lastly,
although no specific type of language remediation is required by § 1703(f),
including "programming" in the statute that will serve to reinforce the necessity
that school districts affirmatively implement remedial language programs.
Recent settlements by the DOJ also emphasize that the above categories should
be included in the understanding of the § 1703(f) "appropriate action"
181
language by requiring action by educational agencies in the above areas.1
82
178. See Diaz-Granados, supra note 133, at 849-50 (highlighting the problem of
inadequate teaching for LEP students).
179. Martha Minow, Surprising Legacies of Brown v. Board, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
11,20 (2004).
180. See, e.g., Pat Kossan, Language-Learning History in Arizona, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb.
28, 2006, at 13A (reporting that in February of 2005, a study found that adequate funding for
LEP students was $1,200 per student instead of the $350 that the Arizona state legislature had
allowed). In December of 2005, Federal Judge Raner Collins ordered lawmakers to improve
LEP education or face a fine of $500,000 a day. Id. The fines are now suspended and the State
Superintendent for Public Instruction, Tom Home is appealing their imposition. Robert Robb,
A Language Barrier; The English-Learner Saga is Worthy of the Twilight Zone, ARiZ.
REPUBLIC, Mar. 8, 2006, at 9B.
181. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2000).
182. See Justice Reaches Settlement with New Jersey School District Regarding
Educational Opportunities, STS. NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 17, 2003 [hereinafter Justice Reaches
Settlement] ("The settlement agreement [between the DOJ and Bound Brook, New York Board
of Education] requires timely assessment of all students with non-English speaking
backgrounds,... monitoring of academic progress,.. . quality curricula and instruction for
English Language Learner students, sufficient library and teacher resources, [and] adequate
teacher training."); see also United States v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 1:80-CV-05124, amended
app'x C (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2006) (entering a consent decree requiring, among other things, that
the Board of Education: assess children for possible placement in a language acquisition
program, allocate sufficient funds to provide language learners with educationally sound
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Critics will argue that the Fifth Circuit, in Castaneda, clearly laid out an
analytical outline, 183 to apply to "appropriate action." Some may claim that its
second prong of the test' 84 already assesses whether the educational agencies
have sufficiently provided for LEP students with respect to identification,
oversight, teacher credentials, and funding. However, the Castaneda test only
applies once the harm has occurred-only once the students are immersed in
programs that are, for example, insufficiently managed or funded. The
amended language seeks to attack the problem before it reaches the courts by
mandating that educational agencies and school districts take "appropriate
action" with respect to these five (and other) specific areas.
Additionally, even if it was said that the Castaneda test evaluated these
five areas, it is important to remember that Castaneda is a Fifth Circuit decision
that is not binding on other circuits. 85 The Seventh Circuit gave only mild
support to the Fifth Circuit's test. 86 Moreover, as stated earlier, the Castaneda
test measures and does not define "appropriate action." Before a Castaneda-
like test can be applied, educational agencies should understand what areas
must be addressed in order to have "appropriate action." This new language
serves to emphasize the affirmative duty on educational agencies to take
"appropriate action."'187
instructional materials, adequately train teachers, and monitor the implementation of its
language acquisition programs); Press Release, Justice Dep't, Justice Department Settles Civil
Rights Allegations Concerning Violence-Plagued Brooklyn High School (June 1, 2004) ("[T]he
consent decree requires the school district reform the school's English Language Learner (ELL)
program to ensure, among other things, adequate assessment, placement, and academic
counseling of ELL students.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
183. This court as well chided Congress on its sparse statutory language. See Castaneda v.
Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Congress has provided us with almost no
guidance, in the form of text or legislative history, to assist us in determining whether a school
district's language remediation efforts are 'appropriate."').
184. Id. at 1010 ("The court's second inquiry would be whether the programs and practices
actually used by a school system are reasonably calculated to implement effectively the
educational theory adopted by the school.").
185. See, e.g., Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698, 712 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (stating that there are "no Ninth Circuit cases which establish a legal framework for
assessing whether or not a particular language remediation program constitutes appropriate
action").
186. Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1041 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Of course, we
do not mean to say that we are adopting without qualification the jurisprudence developed in the
Fifth Circuit regarding the interpretation of the EEOA. However, the Castaneda decision
provides a fruitful starting point for our analysis. The fine tuning must await future cases.").
187. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing the affirmative duty schools
have to help LEP children).
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The amended language will also clarify that, to state a claim, a plaintiff
must look only to the statutory language which requires a showing of (1) a
language barrier; (2) defendant's failure to take appropriate action to overcome
that barrier; and (3) a resulting impediment to the students' equal participation
in instructional programs. Because, as this amendment proposes, the
"appropriate action" language will be enlarged, plaintiffs and courts will more
easily recognize if a violation has occurred and educational agencies will more
clearly understand their responsibilities.
VI. Conclusion
LEP and non-English proficient students face many obstacles; while
English is not the official language of the United States, LEP students suffer
because "the covert language policy of the United States is not neutral, it
favours the English language."' 8' School districts and educational agencies
continue to fall short in their provision of services to LEP students: "[I]f there
were to be any legal presumption for most, if not all, school districts, it would
be that they do not employ sound education theory in devising their programs
for second language assistance."1 89 Thankfully, thirty-four years after its
inception, the EEOA is still alive and serves as a tool for securing equal
education in the schools by LEP students.
However, efforts must continue to protect LEP students. The DOJ has
intervened in numerous cases and initiated its own investigation of educational
agencies' language remediation programs. President Bush has also shown
interest in assuring that LEP students receive equality of education by
supporting the DOJ's enforcement of the EEOA 190 and by passing the No Child
Left Behind Act. 19' In order to further ensure equal educational opportunity for
188. Nufiez-Janes, supra note 21, at 73 (citations omitted).
189. Haas, supra note 120, at 379; see, e.g., Cortes, supra note 108, at 99 (arguing that
Texas currently lacks a language education program that "focuses, addresses, and remedies the
needs of language-minority students").
190. Justice Reaches Settlement, supra note 182 ("'This comprehensive settlement
agreement reflects the Bush Administration's ongoing efforts to ensure that those with limited
English proficiency are able to learn the language and receive a quality education."' (quoting R.
Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department's Civil Rights
Division)).
191. No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified at 20
U.S.C.A. §§ 6301-6578, §§ 6801-7014 (2003)). The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) is
beyond the scope of this Note. However, Title I and Title III of the Act do affect LEP students.
For more information on the effects of NCLB as well as a comprehensive report on LEP student
statistics, see RANDY CAPPS ET AL., URBAN INST., THE NEW DEMOGRAPHY OF AMERICA'S
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LEP students, Congress must expressly signal that a failure to take "appropriate
action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its
students"'192 extends beyond programming and includes failures in
identification, oversight, teacher hiring, and funding.
SCHOOLS: IMMIGRATION AND THE No CHLD LEFT BEHIND ACT (2005), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311230_newdemography.pdf(last visited Mar. 17,2008)
(describing the change in primary and secondary education as a result in recent immigration).
Title I requires schools to improve LEP students' performance on reading and math assessments
beginning in third grade. Id. at 3. Title III requires schools to measure and improve students'
English proficiency. Id. It holds states accountable for improving English proficiency on an
annual basis. Id.
192. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2000).
